Greetings loyal blog readers! I am happy to report that today’s Toronto Star contains a letter of mine (the first of the two on this page) about the Ontario Court of Appeal decision on expat voting rights. Rather than address this issue directly, I briefly examine the related matter of extending the franchise to non-citizens who live in Canada. Enjoy!
Direct democracy is to representative democracy what extra-virgin olive oil is to refined olive oil. The latter is more cost effective and, perhaps according to some, just as good. But to the connoisseur, there is no substitute for the real stuff.
In the fourth article of his ongoing series on democracy, Toronto Star columnist Rick Salutin examines the real stuff in the form of Swiss referendums. Several national referendums are held together four times per year in Switzerland on everything from tax policy to constitutional amendments to international treaties. Direct democracy advocates all around the world look on enviously, and it is easy to understand why. Whatever it is that makes representative democracy good — equality, civic engagement, rule by the people, etc. — surely makes direct democracy even better.
In his Patterns of Democracy, Dutch-American political scientist Arend Lijphart makes the somewhat counterintuitive argument that referendums, when initiated by citizens as they frequently are in Switzerland, can be used as a tool for consensus rather than blunt majoritarianism. Citizens’ initiatives allow a minority of the population (Switzerland requires a minimum of 50,000 to 100,000 signatories on such petitions) to make proposals or present challenges that would otherwise go unconsidered by elected lawmakers. More than 50 percent of voters must ultimately approve the initiative in the ensuing referendum in order for it to pass, but the key point is minorities now have a chance they would not otherwise have to persuade the majority. Salutin notes that Swiss laws live in “the shadow of the referendum,” and thus that lawmakers preemptively build broad-based compromises into their legislation in order to avoid challenge.
But does it always work out that way? How about the famous 2009 referendum in which the Swiss, apparently inspired by anti-Muslim xenophobia, voted to ban the construction of minarets? Far from consensus democracy, this seems more a case of that much condemned “tyranny of the majority.” Referendums, it is commonly warned, merely enable the violation of individual and minority rights.
Can this be guarded against? Is there any way to keep the good referendums while tossing out the bad ones? The most reliable protection against majoritarian tyranny is without doubt a strong written constitution backed up by judicial review, but the drafters of a constitution cannot possibly anticipate every future impingement upon individual and minority rights. What other options are there?
One source of inspiration is the Recall and Initiative Act here in British Columbia (the only Canadian province where such a law exists). Once the required number of signatures is gathered on an initiative, the proposed legislation is simply handed to the Legislature. By convention, it is commonly expected that a successful initiative will be put before the public in a referendum, but if they wish, lawmakers may simply choose to vote yea or nay on their own.
I personally believe that this procedure strikes the right balance, although not every other aspect of the law is reasonable. In giving canvassers only three months to gather the signatures of 10 percent of registered voters in every single riding, the bar is set way too high. It is no coincidence that since the Act came into effect in 1995, only one initiative out of seven attempts has passed the required threshold. For the initiative law to have a significant impact, the minimum number of signatures should be lowered or the amount of time set aside for gathering them should be increased. But the Legislature’s decision to retain a final say as a safeguard against abuse is a good idea (as are some of the campaign finance rules).
So let open-minded democrats the world over consider the advantages of Swiss-style direct democracy while remaining wary of the risks. In order to function properly, it requires careful institutional design and an informed and engaged citizenry. If these conditions are met, the reward is democracy as it was always meant to be.
“Democracy,” as Winston Churchill famously stated, “is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Less famously, he also remarked that “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.” (Please note: this second quote, it turns out, is misattributed. 4 January 2019)
Notwithstanding this somewhat anemic endorsement, those who live under democracy tend to quite like it. We often devote ourselves to attempts at strengthening the people’s rule. A recent effort in this vein comes courtesy of columnist Rick Salutin and his series on democratic renewal for the Toronto Star.
Salutin, in the second instalment of his series, places much of the blame for what ails Canadian democracy on political parties. According to him, parties “don’t exist to represent the views of the public, or even sections of it, or even their own members. Maybe they once did, or maybe not. But now they exist to win elections.” He describes historical bids to loosen their grip on power and notes the almost universal failure of such efforts “as if the system we have generates antibodies to invasive, democratizing forces and rejects them while bulking up the undemocratic elements.” His piece strongly implies that we should do away with parties altogether and allow MPs to represent their constituents without mediation, while lamenting that this is unlikely to ever happen.
My own position is somewhere between Salutin’s and the status quo. I am glad there are parties for two reasons. First, they serve as a kind of shorthand for voters. It is not reasonable to expect all people to conduct detailed research into the policy planks of each of their local candidates (even if perhaps they should be paying at least a little more attention than they currently do). Party affiliation allows voters to make reasonable assumptions about candidates’ values. Second, and more importantly, an MP’s membership in a party is a sign that he or she is capable of working with others and being held accountable. These are important virtues for anyone who seeks to govern.
However, it is hard to deny that in our current system, parties have far more power than they need. But rather than eliminating them, the solution lies simply in allowing more free votes in Parliament. I would not go so far as to say that no Parliamentary votes should ever be whipped, but why not make such a practice the exception rather than the rule? An increased number of free votes, in addition to allowing MPs to more directly represent the views of their constituents, would enable the House of Commons to more effectively fulfill its deliberative function. Debates might become opportunities for persuasion and give-and-take, rather than merely parroting the party line.
More surprising than Salutin’s critique of Canada’s rigid party system is his somewhat cooled attitude towards proportional representation (PR). While he confesses that he sits “on the advisory board of a group that advocates PR” and says that he would “still vote for PR, but in a sour frame of mind,” he appears no longer to be one of the “true believers” primarily for two reasons.
First, mere electoral reform does not go far enough. In his words, “I find it a little embarrassing that our main contribution to the global movement toward democratic renewal is an earnest effort to do so little.” Put another way, “Maybe the problem isn’t how parties are represented; maybe it’s parties . . . .” His second issue with PR is that it may actually exacerbate the problem. Parties, he says, “would wax even stronger under PR than they do now.”
While I can sympathize with Salutin’s first objection, I am not sure that I agree with his second. The tyrannical nature of parties is more a matter of political culture than institutional arrangement. But even disregarding this fact, there is no reason to believe that parties would hold more power over MPs under forms of PR that require voters to select individual candidates, like mixed-member proportional (MMP) and the single transferable vote (STV). In fact, it is possible that parties might become slightly weaker under STV or even open-list PR, as such systems require candidates of the same party to compete against one another for votes.
All this being said, Salutin’s article is a fascinating one and I encourage people to read it. If it begins a conversation that ends with a moderation of Canada’s antiquated system of party discipline, then I will find it hard to fault him for our minor areas of disagreement. I eagerly await all subsequent instalments in his series on democracy.
Song of the Watermelon 